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Boise, February 2012 Term 
2012 Opinion No. 56 
Filed: March 22, 2012 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. Honorable Gregory M. Culet, District Judge. 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings. 
Hall, Friedly & Ward, Mountain Home, for appellant. 
Rebecca A Rainey, P.A., Boise, for respondent. 
J. JONES, Justice. 
This appeal involves a decade-long fight over title to a piece of real property. Juan Cuevas 
allegedly agreed to sell the property to Bernardino Barraza in 200 I. However, after Barraza failed 
to pay the purchase price, Juan filed a quiet title action against Barraza. Barraza defaulted. While 
Barraza was seeking to set aside the default, Juan quitclaimed the property to his relative, Wilfrido 
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Cuevas. Meanwhile, Barraza was successful in setting aside the default on appeal. On remand, 
Juan defaulted and the district court quieted title in Barraza. Wilfrido then filed the present quiet 
title action against Barraza, in which the district court found the default judgment against Juan void 
and quieted title in Wilfrido. For the reasons outlined below, we agree that the default judgment 
against Juan is void, but we vacate the summary judgment quieting title in Wilfrido as against 
Barraza. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Juan") jointly held 
title to real property commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho, pursuant to a warranty 
deed recorded in Canyon County on June 15, 1993. In March 2001, Juan allegedly executed a 
written contract to sell the property to Bernardino Barraza and Liobaldo Garza (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Barraza") for a total purchase price of $80,000. 1 
Barraza claims he paid a total of $22,635 toward the purchase, but then the agreement fell 
apart. He asserts Juan agreed to repay him $20,000 upon resale of the property if he would vacate 
the premises, which he did. Barraza claims Juan never repaid any money. In response, on May 6, 
2002, Barraza recorded a claim of lien against the property, purportedly securing an "unpaid refund 
in the amount $20,000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title."2 
Wilfrido Cuevas claims he began purchasing the property under an oral agreement with 
Juan in August of 2003. At that time he moved onto the property with his family, began making 
improvements to it, started paying the property taxes on it, and began making payments to Juan 
pursuant to the oral agreement. 
On April 2, 2007, Juan filed a quiet title action against Barraza, seeking to clear his title of 
Barraza's purported lien. Barraza failed to respond, and the district court entered a default 
judgment against him May 15, 2007, which was recorded May 17, 2007. On May 24, 2007, 
Barraza moved to set aside the default judgment, attaching his proposed Answer and 
Counterclaim-which included an affirmative request for the court to quiet title in his name-to 
his attorney's affidavit in support of that motion. 
1 The alleged contract constitutes two handwritten pages-one in English (the English Document), one in Spanish 
(the Spanish Document). Because Baez' signature does not appear on the contract, the parties dispute whether she 
was involved in this transaction. 
2 The lien was re-recorded on January 31, 2007. 
2 
000008 
Around June 13, 2007, Wilfrido claims he paid the remaining balance of the purchase price 
to Juan pursuant to their oral contract, based on his understanding that Juan had successfully 
quieted title. Juan executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest to Wilfrido, and Wilfrido 
claims he researched the Canyon County land records to ensure title was clear before recording it 
on June 20, 2007.3 
On June 25, 2007, the district court denied Barraza's motion to set aside the default 
judgment, and Barraza appealed. On June 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion 
vacating the default judgment and remanding the case. Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198 
P.3d 740 (Ct. App. 2008). The Court of Appeals held that (1) Barraza's poor English and mistaken 
belief that he was being represented by counsel constituted mistake or excusable neglect sufficient 
to set aside the judgment, and (2) the proposed Answer and Counterclaim served with Barraza's 
motion presented a meritorious breach of contract defense to the quiet title action. Id 
Following issuance of the Court of Appeals opinion, Barraza recorded a !is pendens against 
the property on August 6, 2008. On January 6, 2009, the Court of Appeals entered the Remittitur, 
and on January 15, 2009, the district court granted Juan's attorney leave to withdraw. Although a 
copy of the order granting leave to withdraw was mailed to Juan on January 23, 2009, Juan failed 
to appear. The district court entered default judgment quieting title in Barraza on March 17, 2009, 
and Barraza recorded the quiet title judgment on March 24, 2009. 
After learning that he no longer held title to the property, Wilfrido filed a new suit against 
Barraza to quiet title on August 7, 2009, and Barraza answered. Wilfrido moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the default judgment entered against Juan was void. The district court 
granted that motion, ruling from the bench that (1) the judgment was void for lack of notice 
because the Answer and Counterclaim was never properly filed or served on Juan and, (2) 
alternatively, Wilfrido could collaterally attack the judgment notwithstanding the doctrine of res 
judicata because he was not in privity with Juan. 
3 Barraza claims that Wilfrido had several conversations with Barraza about the property and prior sale before Juan 
initiated his quiet title action. According to Barraza: Wilfrido told Barraza that he knew about the prior transaction 
but that Juan was planning to sell Wilfrido the property; Wilfrido called him to request copies of payments and 
documents Barraza had regarding the prior transaction; Wilfrido told Barraza that Barraza should demand a refund 
of his down payment from Juan so that Wilfrido could buy the property instead; and the two discussed retaining an 
attorney to ensure that Juan was dealing with them both fairly. Apparently, communication between the two then 
broke down. However, Wilfrido admits he was generally aware of the lawsuit and Barraza's recorded claim of lien. 
At summary judgment, Barraza swore that Wilfrido knew at the time he recorded his quitclaim deed about Barraza's 
claims on the property and, in fact, that was the reason Juan executed only a quitclaim deed. 
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Following limited discovery, Wilfrido again moved for summary judgment, seeking to 
quiet title in the property and arguing that Barraza did not have a viable unjust enrichment claim 
against Wilfrido. The district court also granted this second motion, ruling from the bench that ( 1) 
Barraza failed to establish a valid claim against the property, and (2) Barraza did not unjustly 
enrich Wilfrido. The district court denied Barraza's motion to reconsider and entered judgment 
quieting title in Wilfrido's name. Barraza timely appealed. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the district court err in ruling that Barraza's default judgment against Juan is void 
or, alternatively, that the judgment is not precluded from attack by res judicata? 
II. Did the district court err in quieting title in Wilfrido free and clear of any interest 
claimed by Barraza? 
III. Did the district court err in ruling that Barraza did not have a viable unjust enrichment 
claim against Wilfrido? 
IV. Is either party entitled to attorney fees? 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Mackay v. Four Rivers 
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). Summary judgment is 
appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." l.R.C.P. 56(c). "[A]ll reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party," and 
disputed facts will be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Mackay, 145 Idaho at 
410, 179 P .3d at 1066. However, the nonmoving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a 
scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Van v. Portneuf 
Med Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). This Court reviews questions of 
law de novo. Martin v. Camas County ex rel. Bd o/Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 511, 248 P.3d 
1243, 1246 (2011). 
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B. The district court correctly found the prior default judgment against Juan to 
be void for lack of notice. 
In granting Wilfrido's first motion for summary judgment, the district court found the prior 
default judgment quieting title in Barraza to be void because Barraza's Answer and Counterclaim 
requesting that relief was never filed with the court nor served on Juan, except as an attachment to 
his attorney's affidavit supporting the motion to set aside. On appeal, Barraza argues that the 
Answer and Counterclaim was either (1) properly filed and served pursuant to I.R.C.P. 5 along 
with the motion to set aside, or (2) deemed filed and served by virtue of the Court of Appeals' 
references to, and reliance upon, it in the opinion. Wilfrido responds that simply attaching a 
proposed pleading to an affidavit supporting a motion, even when the motion and affidavit are 
properly filed and served, does not constitute filing and service of that pleading. Wilfrido also 
argues that the Court of Appeals' decision could not operate to deem the Answer and Counterclaim 
filed. 
Generally, "final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack." 
Kukuruza v. Kukuruza, 120 Idaho 630, 632, 818 P.2d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis 
original). However, a void judgment can be attacked at any time by any person adversely affected 
by it. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). This Court "narrowly 
construe[s] what constitutes a void judgment." Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 
Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d 340, 344 (2005). 
In order for a judgment to be void, there must generally ·be some 
jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either because 
the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 669 P.2d 191 (1983). A 
judgment is also void where it is entered in violation of due process because the 
party was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Prather v. Loyd, 86 
Idaho 45, 382 P.2d 910 (1963) ... 
Id (quoting McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 558, 82 P.3d 833, 840 (2003)). See also Meyers 
v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 191, 221 P.3d 81, 89 (2009). Here, it appears that the district court 
declared the judgment void because Juan was not given adequate notice of Barraza's affirmative 
claim to quiet title, due to Barraza's failure to adhere to the I.R.C.P. 5 filing and service 
requirements. 
Rule 5(a) requires that "every pleading subsequent to the original complaint ... shall be 
served upon each of the parties affected thereby." Further, Rule 5( d) states that "[a ]11 papers after 
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the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service 
or within a reasonable time thereafter." Finally, Rule 5(e)(l) provides that filing with the court 
requires filing with the judge or clerk, at which point "[t]he judge or clerk shall indorse upon every 
pleading and other paper the hour and minute of its filing." 
Although this Court has not specifically addressed the issue, the Court of Appeals has held 
that service and filing of a motion for leave to file a counterclaim, even where the proposed 
counterclaim is attached, is not the equivalent of service and filing of the counterclaim itself. 
Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 70, 995 P.2d 835, 840 (Ct. App. 2000). The Viafax 
court reasoned: 
As Viafax argues, receipt of the motion gave it notice only that it could object to a 
counterclaim being filed and that the motion might be granted. It remained possible 
that the court would deny the motion, even without an objection from Viafax, or 
that Stuckenbrock would abandon the effort. Filing and service of the counterclaim 
itself could be properly accomplished only after permission had been obtained from 
the court. Such service was never performed. 
In short, Viafax was never served with a pleading that it was obliged to answer in 
order to avoid the risk of a default judgment. 
Id (citations omitted). 
Although the Viafax court was addressing a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 
60(b )( 4), which requires a showing of "surprise," the concept of "surprise" is virtually identical to 
lack of notice. See id Thus, we find the same logic applies to the present case. The only time 
Barraza presented the Answer and Counterclaim to Juan and the district court was as an attachment 
to the affidavit in support of his motion to set aside the default judgment. It was not filed with the 
clerk with its own file stamp pursuant to Rules 5(d) and (e)(l), or served on Juan pursuant to Rule 
5( a). Thus, Juan only received notice that he could oppose the motion to set aside rather than notice 
of an obligation to respond to the affirmative request for relief in Barraza's pleading. 
The civil rules are designed to ensure that each party receives adequate notice and 
opportunity to be heard. Compliance with Rule 5, in particular, goes to the heart of the notice 
requirement, and we cannot find that Juan received due process where Barraza's responsive 
pleading was not individually filed or served in compliance with that rule. Further, the Court of 
Appeals decision to vacate the default judgment merely permitted Barraza to file and serve the 
Answer and Counterclaim on Juan; it did not-nor could it-"deem" the pleading filed and served. 
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Thus, the district court in the present case was correct that the prior default judgment against Juan 
is void. 
The parties also dispute the district court's alternative ruling that, even ifthe prior judgment 
is not void, it is not precluded from attack by res judicata because Wilfrido is not Juan's privy. 
However, because we agree that the prior judgment is void for lack of notice, we need not address 
the propriety of the district court's alternative ruling. 
C. The district court erred in quieting Wilfrido's title on summary judgment 
because Barraza demonstrated factual issues as to whether Wilfrido took title 
subject to a statutory claim by Barraza. 
Turning to Wilfrido's second motion for summary judgment, the district court held that 
Barraza had failed to establish a legally valid claim against the property and therefore quieted title 
in Wilfrido's name. According to the court, "If a lien is improperly filed as a mechanics lien and 
the lien is not one otherwise recognized by law, then the lien is a nonconsensual common law lien 
and is properly subject to a court order removing the lien, Idaho Code § 45-1703." Barraza argues 
that he established a valid interest in the property and that Wilfrido had notice of his claim so he 
cannot be a bona fide purchaser. Wilfrido responds that he is the presumptive owner of the 
property by virtue of the quitclaim deed he received from Juan and that he took title to the property 
free from any valid claim of Barraza. He asserts that Barraza was unable to show that he held a 
valid, enforceable interest in the property prior to the recording of the deed. 
While the parties spar back and forth over issues that are not particularly relevant-whether 
the district court should have considered evidence of the oral contract between Juan and Wilfrido 
to purchase the property, whether Barraza' s contract with Juan satisfied the statute of frauds, and 
whether Barraza was entitled to specific performance of that contract4-the pertinent question is 
whether Barraza presented competent evidence of a legally recognizable claim against the property 
4 Although Barraza asserts he is entitled to specific performance of the contract he entered into with Juan in March 
of 2001, the record discloses several seemingly insurmountable obstacles to such a claim. First and foremost, an 
examination of Barraza's counterclaim fails to disclose a claim for specific performance. Even if he had alleged 
such a claim, it is not readily apparent that the contract between the parties complies with the statute of frauds, 
particularly the requirement that the contract must "either contain a sufficient description of the real property or refer 
to an external record containing a sufficient property description." Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 
1174, 1178 (2009). Neither the Spanish Document nor the English Document contains a legal description of the 
property. The Spanish Document ends with words translated as, "We need the Ranch's address." The English 
Document merely describes the ranch as "29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, ID 83660." There are a number of other 
potential infirmities, such as the lack of Baez' signature on either version of the contract, unclear payment terms, 
potential application of )aches, and no showing that Barraza made a tender of the balance of the purchase price, 
among other things. Suffice it to say that this is simply not a viable claim and need not be dealt with further here. 
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so as to withstand summary judgment. The record clearly discloses genuine issues of material fac~ 
as to whether Barraza asserted a legally recognized lien against the property and, if so, whether 
Wilfrido took subject to that lien. 
Although Barraza does not specifically identify his claim against the property as a 
"vendee's lien," his claim certainly appears to fit the elements of that type of statutory lien. A 
vendee' s lien is described in LC. § 45-804, as follows: 
One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an 
agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of 
possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, 
in case of a failure of consideration. 
In his claim oflien, which was recorded twice-May 6, 2002, and January 31, 2007-before the 
quitclaim deed from Juan to Wilfrido, Barraza asserted a lien for "unpaid refund in the amount of 
$20,000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title." The lien claim attached and incorporated a 
valid legal description of the property. We recently held in Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank No. 37814, 
152 Idaho 215, _, 268 P.3d 1167, 1175 (2012), that "it is the payment to the owner of any part of 
the purchase price of the real property under an agreement of sale that creates the lien." Barraza' s 
claim of lien indicates that the $20,000 payment had been made on or before January 5, 2002, so 
presumably the statutory lien attached at or prior to that date. It should be noted that the lien is 
created upon the payment of any part of the purchase price and is not dependent upon the recording 
of a written document. The claim of lien filed by Barraza in this case does, however, constitute 
evidence bearing on the question of what notice may have been imparted to subsequent purchasers 
of the property. 
Besides asserting that Barraza established no credible claim against the property, Wilfrido 
asserts that he was a bona fide purchaser. The pertinent statute is LC. § 45-803, which provides, 
"The liens of vendors and purchasers of real property are valid against every one claiming under 
the debtor, except a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for value." In Benz we held that 
"good faith," as used in this statute, means without "actual or constructive knowledge of the 
applicable lien." Id. at_, 268 P.3d at 1180. Barraza asserts in his affidavit that Juan was aware 
of the $20,000 claim he asserted against the property and that Juan knew it was money that had 
been paid toward the purchase price of the property. In an affidavit, Wilfrido acknowledged that 
he was aware Juan had brought a suit against Barraza "because of a $20,000 claim of lien that was 
filed against the property." Certainly, the recording and re-recording of the written claim of lien 
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would have put Wilfrido on notice of Barraza's claim. Wilfrido may have questioned the validity 
of the claim, but he certainly was aware of it and therefore could not be a good faith purchaser 
under LC. § 45-803. 
This is not to say that Wilfrido may not have defenses against Barraza's claim. We do not 
opine on that issue, as it has not been presented on appeal. What is apparent is that the district 
court erred in quieting title in favor of Wilfrido as against Barraza because genuine issues of fact 
existed as to whether or not Barraza had asserted a legitimate claim against the property. The 
district court erred in determining that Barraza's claim of lien was not authorized by statute and 
"constitutes a nonconsensual common law lien, and is invalid and unenforceable," citing LC. § 45-
1702. A vendee' s lien is authorized by statute and, therefore, does not fit the description of a 
nonconsensual lien. Barraza presented sufficient evidence of a vendee's lien to survive summary 
judgment. The judgment, insofar as it quiets title in Wilfi:ido against Barraza, is vacated and the 
case is remanded to determine the issue of Barraza' s rights, if any, under LC. § 45-803. 
D. The district court correctly ruled that Barraza did not have a viable unjust 
enrichment claim against Wilfrido. 
The district court summarily dismissed Barraza's unjust enrichment claim against Wilfi:ido. 
On appeal, Barraza argues that his improvements and down payment on the property unjustly 
enriched Wilfi:ido. Wilfrido argues that those items, even if causing incidental benefit to Wilfrido, 
were not intended for Wilfi:ido. 
A claim for unjust enrichment requires "that (I) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by 
the plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the 
defendant to accept the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit." Teton Peaks 
Investment Co. v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 398, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (2008). However, the alleged 
recipient must also be the intended beneficiary. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 471, 886 
P.2d 772, 776 (1994). Accordingly, "[r]ecovery for unjust enrichment is unavailable if the benefits 
[to the recipient] were created incidentally by [the claimant] in pursuit of his own financial 
advantage." Id 
As Wilfrido argues, while Barraza alleged he made improvements to the property, and that 
his down payment somehow reduced Wilfi:ido's purchase price, he failed to demonstrate that either 
the improvements or the money were intended to benefit Wilfi:ido. Indeed, Barraza makes no 
assertion that those benefits were created for any other purpose than his own financial gain, and 
they only incidentally benefited Wilfi:ido, if at all. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed 
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Barraza's unjust enrichment claim on summary judgment. 
E. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees. 
Both parties argue for attorney fees on appeal. Barraza argues for fees under LC. §§ 12-
120 and -121. Wilfrido not only seeks attorney fees under LC.§ 12-121, but also sanctions under 
I.AR. 11.2. However, because there was no contract or commercial transaction between Wilfrido 
and Barraza, and because Barraza did not bring a frivolous appeal, we find no basis to award fees. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the district court's judgment finding Barraza's 
prior default judgment against Juan void for lack of notice. However, we vacate the district 
court's quiet title judgment against Barraza. We remand for further proceedings with regard to 
the vendee's lien issue. We decline to award costs or attorney fees to either party. 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANO. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRJDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERt"\JARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et 
al. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 09-8175 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through its counsel of record, Rainey 
Law Office, and hereby moves this court, pursuant to Rule 56(c) Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
for entry of summary judgment, on the grounds that any potential vendee's lien claimed by 
defendant Bernardino Barraza is barred by the statute of limitations. This Motion is supported 
by a memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith. 
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Oral Argument is requested. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 2012. 
RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
Rebecca A. Rainey- of the 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of July 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 E. 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, ID 8364 7 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile 
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910 West Main Street, Suite 258 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANO, DEPUTY 
IN IBE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et 
al. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 09-8175 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Wil:frido Cuevas ("Wil:frido"), by and through his attorney of 
record, Rainey Law Office, and hereby files this memorandum in support of his motion for 
summary judgment: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a dispute over property in Parma, Idaho, that has been in litigation for 
more than five years and involved two lawsuits. It now comes back to this Court on remand 
from the Supreme Court of Idaho. The only issue left to determine is whether Bernardino 
Barraza ("Barraza") has a valid and enforceable vendee's lien, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 45-803. 
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Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 9 (Idaho March 22, 2012). Assuming, arguendo, that a 
vendee's lien exists, the statute oflimitations bars Barraza from enforcing such lien. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Barraza made a payment on or before January 5, 2002.1 Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, 
slip op. at 8 (Idaho March22, 2012).2 
2. Barraza filed a claim of lien on May 6, 2002. 3 
3. Wilfrido filed suit to quiet title on August 7, 2009. See Register of Action. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and 
affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 46, 
28 P.3d 380, 387 (2001). The facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 115, 898 P.2d 43, 46 
(1995). "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the 
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.2d 172, 175 (2007). If the 
nonmoving party fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an 
essential element to that party's case, Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, mandates entry of 
1 The Supreme Court opinion states, "Barraza's claim of lien indicates that the $20,000 payment bad been made on 
or before January 5, 2002, so presumably the statutory lien attached at or prior to that date. It should be noted that 
the lien is cI"eated upon the payment of any part of the purchase price and is not dependent upon the recording of a 
written document." 
2 Williido accepts and adopts as written all facts addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in its decision, for purposes 
of this Motion for Summary Judgment only, and incotporates the same herein. 
3 The same was recorded again on January 31, 2007. 
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summary judgment. Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med Ctr. Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 509, 768 P.2d 
768, 772 (1988). 
IV. ARGUME1''T 
A. Summarv Judgment is appropriate because any vendee's lien is time barred. 
The statute of limitations bars Barraza from enforcing a vendee's lien as a matter oflaw. 
Idaho Code§ 45-804 establishes a vendee's lien: 
45-804. Lien of purchaser of real property. One who pays to the 
owner any part of the price of real property, under an agreement 
for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, 
independent of possession, for such part of the amount paid as he 
may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of 
consideration. 
Assuming, arguendo,4 that a vendee's lien does exist, such lien is barred by any possible statute 
of limitations that might apply. While no Idaho court of appellate review has decided what 
limitations period applies to a vendee's lien, because there were more than seven years between 
the filing ofBarraza's claim of lien and the commencement of this action, there is no limitations 
period long enough under Idaho law to save the alleged claim of lien. 
Of all potential limitations periods that might apply two stand out as potentially 
appropriate: (1) the three-year limitations period for an action upon a liability created by statute, 
Idaho Code § 5-218(1), or (2) a limitations period .. borrowed" from the underlying obligation. 
See Blankenship v. Myers, 97 Idaho 356, 371, 544 P.2d 314, 329 (1975); Rogers v. Crockett, 41 
Idaho 336, 344, 238 P. 894, 896 (1925) (each noting that a vendor's lien can be enforced against 
a vendee only so long as an action can still be brought against the buyer for the unpaid purchase 
4 Critically, in this matter the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's conclusion that there was not a 
valid agreement by and between Barraza and Juan Cuevas for the sale of the Property. In the concurring opinion of 
Shepherdv. Dougan, 58 Idaho 543, 76 P.2d 442 (1937), it was noted that a vendee's lien cannot exist absent a valid 
agreement for the sale of property, although that issue has not been squarely presented to any Idaho court of 
appellate review. 
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price). In this case, the District Court concluded and the Supreme Court affmned Wilfrido's 
arguments that any and all claims that Barraza attempted to bring were invalid and.for 
unenforceable. Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 5-9 (Idaho March 22, 2012). 
Accordingly, there is no possible claim underlying Barraza's alleged vendee's lien from which a 
limitation may be borrm.ved. 
The Supreme Court also noted that the undisputed facts show when a vendee's lien (if 
any) would have been created: '<the $20,000 payment had been made on or before January 5, 
2002, so presumably the statutory lien attached at or prior to that date." Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 
38493, slip op. at 8 (Idaho March 22, 2012). Accordingly, in order to enforce the vendee's lien, 
suit would have had to commence on or before January 5, 2005. The present action was not filed 
until August 7, 2009; the former action (between Juan Cuevas and Barraza) was filed on April 2, 
2007. Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 2 (Idaho March 22, 2012). There simply was 
not an action filed within any limitations period that could apply to the claim of a vendee's lien. 
Accordingly, summary judgment disposing of the single issue remaining in this case is 
appropriate. 
B. The Supreme Court's decision affirms the District Court's judgment in all other 
respects and no other issues remain to be decided. 
Previously, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Wil:frido on two 
separate summary judgment motions. On the first motion, the District Court ruled that a prior 
default judgment quieting title in Barraza was void and that res judicata did not bar Wilfrido 
from collaterally attacking such judgment. Id. at 3. On the second motion, the District Court 
quieted title in Wilfrido on the grounds that Barraza had not established a valid claim. The 
District Court also rejected Barraza's unjust enrichment claim. Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, 
slip op. at 4 (Idaho March 22, 2012). 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed each and every claim that was raised by the 
parties and decided by the District Court. The only matter remaining on remand is whether the 
judgment quieting title was improper because of a previously unspecified vendee's lien. The 
Supreme Court noted that: "[a]lthough Barraza does not specifically identify his claim against 
the property as a 'vendee's lien,' his claim certainly appears to fit the elements of that type of 
statutory lien." Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 8 (Idaho March 22, 2012). As 
discussed above, if a vendee's lien existed, any applicable statute of limitations has run and, 
therefore, bars any such lien claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the statute of limitations bars any claim of "vendee's 
lien" that Barraza might have and there are no other issues for this Court to address on remand. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate, and title to the Property should be quieted in 
Wilfrido's name. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 2012. 
RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of July 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 E. 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile 
~a1~ 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
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ROBERT WARD 
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Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd N~rth Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
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Case No. CV09-8175 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant, Bernardino Barraza~ by and through his attorney of 
record, Robert Ward, of the finn Hall, Friedly & Ward, and pursuant to Rule 56, Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure; moves this Court for summary judgment that Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, has a $20,000.00 vendee's lien. against the real property and that 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, should pay Defendant, Bernardino Barrw..a, the $20,000.00 or 
the property should be sold by the sheriff to satisfy the lien. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings on record in this matter, and the 
Memorandtim in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith. 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
KCANO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DI.STRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LlOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 




Case No. CV09-8175 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
The above-named defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, Hall, Friedly & 
Ward, submits this memorandum in support of the defendant Bernardino Barraza's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in opposition to the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS 
Thls case is on remand from the Supreme Court ofidaho who ovcitumed the granting of 
the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment by the district judge~ finding that there was 
sufficient evidence to support a claim by Bemardino Barraw for a vendee's lien against the real 
property. See Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012). 
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II. FACTS 
All facts refel:red to in this memorandum are folUld in the Facts and Procedural section of 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337 (2012), and in the affidavits and pleadings on 
file with this court. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of matelial fact exists 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Idaho R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); Baxter; 135 Idaho at 170, J 6 P.3d at 267. TI1e moving party carries the 
burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Baxter, 135 
Idaho at 170, 16 P .3d at 267. 
In construing the record on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions must be drawn in favor of the party opposing 
swnmary judgment Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 
49, 951 P.2d 1272~ 1276 (1997). The nonmoving party, however, ''may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings~ but the party's 
response, by affidavits or ... othe1wise ... ,must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for triaJ.'' Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e); Baxter, 135 Idaho at 
170~ 16 P.3d at 267. '~A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of fact," but circumstantial evidence may suffice. Tingley v. 
Harrison, 125 Idaho 86:- 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 
Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986), Still, the evidence offered in support 
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 ldaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). 
Banner Life .lns. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117~ 123; 206 P.3d 
481, 487 (2009). 
IV. ISSUES 
1. Whether Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien against the real property. 
2. Whether the statute of limitations bars Bernardino Barraza from enforcing 
the lien. 
V. ARGUMENT 
1. Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien on the real property and his vendee's 
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lien is fully enforceable against the plaintiff. 
In 1887, the territorial legislature created statutory vendor's and ven.dee's liens, 
which are now codified as Idaho Code sections 45-801and45-804 .... 
Section 45-804 states, 
One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an 
agreement for the sale thereof, has a special Hen upon the property, independent 
of possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover 
hack, in case of a failure of consideration. 
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In 1 &87,, the territorial legislature also enacted what is now codified as Idaho Code 
section. 45-803, which states: 
The liens of ve11dors and purchasers of real property are valid against every one 
claiming under the debtor, except a purchaser or en.cum.brancer in good faith and 
for value. 
Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167, 1177 (2012). 
Bernardino Barraza clearly has a vendee's lien. Bernardino Barraza had an. agreement 
with Juan Cuevas to purchase the real property which is the subject of this litigation. Bernardino 
Barraza paid to Juan. Cuevas over $20,000.00 toward the purchase of the property and occupied 
the real property. Juan Cuevas later approached Bernardino Barraza and requested him to vacate 
the property and said that if Bernardino Barraza would vacate the property, Juan Cuevas would 
refund to him the $20,000.00 down payment once the real property was sold to another 
purchaser. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 ldaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 339 (2012). Bemardino Barraza 
vacated the property and filed a lien to notify the world that he had an interest in the property "in 
the amount of $20,000.00 for the payments on Real Estate Title.': Id. Juan Cuevas filed a Quiet 
Title Action on April 2, 2007, to remove the lien that Bernardino Barra7..a filed. Id At no time 
prior to the Quiet Title Action did Juan Cuevas deed the real property or record any transfer of 
owi1ership to the property. Id. See also the affidavits of the parties on file with the court. 
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This clearly created a vendee's lien in favor of Bernardino Barraza on the real property. 
The c.onsideration of the agreement, the transfer of the real property to Bernardino Barraza by 
Juan Cuevas) failed because Juan Cuevas failed to transfer the property or refund the $20,000.00 
as promised. Bernardino Barrv,a could not technically collect the $20,000.00 from Juan Cuevas 
until Juan Cuevas had re-sold the property as the parties agreed, but this did not lessen 
Bernardino Barraza's interest or claim in the real property. 
Therefore, Bernardino Barraza was acting well within in his rights to notify the world by 
recording his lien, but he could not enforce the lien until Juan Cuevas failed to refund the 
$20,000.00 to Bernardino Barraza. Moreover, the vendee's lien is valid against the plaintiff 
because he was not a purchaser in good faith, and the plaintiff was specifically held by the 
Supreme Court ofldaho to have actual knowledge of Bernardino Barra:za's lien/claim. See 
Cuevas v. Barraza .. 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012). 
For all of the reasons stated above, Bernardino Barraza had a vendee's lien on the real 
prope.rty and the lien was valid against the plaintiff. 
2. The statute oflimitations has not run on the vendee's lien because the statute 
of I.imitations on Bernardino Barraza's underlying claim for failure of 
considerationfbreacb of contract by Juan Cuevas has not run. 
The Supreme Coul1 ofldaho established in Blankenship v. Myers, the rule for 
detennining th.e statute of limitations on a vendor~s lien, which would apply to the vendee's lien 
that is established by the same statute. The Supreme Court stated: 
The vendor's lien is a Hen created by statute, J.C. § 45·801, to protect the 
unsecured seller of real property by giving him rights in the property sold, subject 
to the rights of a good faith purchaser for value as provided in J.C. § 454 803, 
when he has no other collateral to secure payment for the property. This statutory 
lien codified the comm011 law rule which established a vendor's lien under similar 
circU1l'.lstances. At common law the vendor's lien generally could be enforced 
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against the ve11dee as long as the vendor could still bring an. action against the 
buyer for the unpaid purchac;e ptice. See 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor & Purchaser, s 
462, p. 588 (1975). An action for enforcement of a vendor1s lien and an action for 
the unpaid purchase price are so interrelated that it is reasonable to conclude that 
the legislature intended that the statute of limitations for the lien claim would run 
only when the statute of limitati.ons runs to bar the claim for the debt. We adopt 
the following language of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Finnell 
v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589, 105 P. 740 (1909), in which the California court, which 
construed a vendor's lien statute substantially identical to Idaho's, stated: 
'111e right of a vendor to enforce his lien continues, unless waived, so long as an 
action can be commenced for the purchase money ... .' 105 P. at 744 . 
. . . We conclude that as long as the claim is n.ot barred, the lien is not barred. 
Blankenship v. J.1yers, 97 Idaho 356, 370-71, 544 P.2d 314, 328-29 (1975). Therefore, following 
the Jogic of the Supreme Court in Blankenship the statute of limitations on the vendee' s lien in 
this matter is enforceable so long as the statute of limitations on Bernardino Barraza's claim for 
the $20,000.00 has not run. 
The statute of limitations for a written cont.Tact in Idaho is five years. I.C. § 5-216. The 
statute of limitations on an oral contract in Idaho is four years. I.C. § 5~217. Bernardino 
Barraza' s claim arises from a written contract with Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the real 
property at issue in this litigation. The contract was subsequently modified by the parties when 
Juan Cuevas told Bernardino Barraza that if he vacated the real property, Juan Cuevas would 
refund $20,000.00 to Bernardino Barraza. when Juan Cuevas sold the property to another party. 
The underlying contract was in writing, but the modification was oral. Because Bernardino 
Barraza's claim was based upon a Virritten contract, the statute oflim.itations should be five years, 
but even if a court determines that because the modification to the contract was oral, Bernardino 
Barraza' s claims are based upon ·an oral contract, the statute of limitations to pursue Bernardino 
Barraza's claim is fm1r years. 
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Regardless of whether the statute of limitations is four or five years, the statute of 
limitations has not expired in either event. The statute of limitations for a breach of contract does 
not began to nm until the time of the breach. This issue was addressed very clearly in the 
previous Cuevas v. Barraza ~y the Court of Appeals. 
A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for limitations 
purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11 P.3d 201 26 (2000); 
Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 180) 484 P.2d 728, 729 (1971). The five-year 
statute oflimitation for Barraza to bring this breach of contract claim began to run 
when Barra?...a became aware of the breach. The breach alleged in Barraza's 
answer occun·ed when Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action-April 2, 2007. 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008). "The instant quiet 
title action1' referred to by the Court of Appeals was the quiet title action that Juan Cuevas filed 
against Bernardino Barraza rather than selling the property to a third party and paying 
Bernardino Barraza the $20,000.00 that Juan Cuevas owed to Bernardino Barra?.,a. 
Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until April 7, 2007. The plaintiff 
in this action filed his quiet title action on August 7, 2009. Bernardino Barraza timely filed his 
Answer, and filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on 12/18/2009. See Register of 
Action. Therefore, without taking into consideration whether the time that the first Cuevas v 
Barraza was up on appeal~ and the time that Bernardino Barraza was the owner of title of the real 
property, tolled the statute of limitations, Bernardino Barraza preserved his claim by timely filing 
his Amcn.ded Answer and Counterclaim. 
The plaintiff may argue that Bernai-di110 Barraza did not allege in his Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim that he had a vendee's lien. However, this is irrelevant because Bernardino 
Barraza did set forth in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim all of the conduct, transactions~ 
or occurrences that comprise the claim of a vendee's lien. Indeed! it was from these very 
aHegations that Bernardino Barraza set forth and the Supreme Court held that there was 
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sufficient evidence of a vendee' s lien to sttrvive summary judgment. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 
Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012). Indeed, that is why this case was remanded. Because the 
Supreme Court ofidaho set aside Bernardino Barraza's quiet title judgment as owner of the 
property, and held that he has a vendee's lien instead, Bernardino Barraza may, if necessary, 
am.end his pleadings by leave of the court to include his claim for the vendee's lien and to 
foreclose 011 the vendee' s lien, and those claims would relate back to the date of Bernardino 
Barraza's Answer and Counterclaim for purposes of the statute of limitations. Rule 15(c) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the am.endment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading. 
Tl1erefore, the statute of 1imitatio11s has not run because Bernardino Barraza filed his claim with 
the court well within the four or five year statute of limitations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated above, Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien against the 
real pi:operty at issue in this case. The lien is not barred by the statute oflimitations, and this 
Court should deny the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grant Bernardino Barraza's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and find as a matter of law that Bernardino Barraza has a 
$20,000.00 lien against the real property and that the plaintiff should pay to Bernardino Barra?.a 
the $20,000.00 or grant the sale of the real property by the sheriff to satisfy the Hen. 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAA'YON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et 
al. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 09-8175 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
OPPOSITION TO BARRAZA'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas ("Wilfrido"), by and through his attorney of 
record, Rainey Law Office, submits this reply brief in support of his motion for summary 
judgment, and in opposition to Barraza' s motion for summary judgment, and states as follows: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case was remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court to detennine a single issue: what 
rights, if any, does Barraza have under a vendee's lien theory under Idaho Code § 45-803. In 
accordance vvith this Court's briefing schedule, Wilfrido moved for summary judgment arguing 
that if any vendee' s lien ever did exist, the statute of limitation bars Barraza from enforcing such 
lien. In opposition, Barraza asserts that the limitations period for enforcing such lien does not 
run until the limitations period for the underlying contract action that gives rise to the vendee's 
lien begins to run. This argument highlights the fi.mdamental flaw in Barraza's vendee's lien 
theory: there was not a valid contract underlying Barraza's alleged vendee's lien. Because there 
is not an underlying contract, there cannot be a vendee's lien. To recognize a vendee's lien 
under the undisputed facts of this case would wholly circumvent the statute of frauds. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Barraza does not have a vendee' s lien. 
The Supreme Court remanded this case for a determination of whether Barraza had a 
vendee's lien under Idaho Code Section 45-804, which provides: 
One who pays to the mvner any part of the price of real property, 
under an agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the 
property, jndependent of possession, for such part of the amount 
paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of 
consideration. 
This statutory section requires three things for a vendees lien to exist: (i) payment of a portion of 
the purchase price for real property by the vendee to the vendor, (ii) such payment is made 
"under an agreement for the sale [of the real property]"; and (iii) a failure of consideration: i.e., 
the real property is not conveyed in accordance with the agreement for sale. 
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No Idaho court of appellate review has directly addressed the question of whether an 
invalid and unenforceable agreement for the sale of real property is sufficient to give rise to a 
vendee's lien. However, in the case of Shepherd v. Dougan, (ultimately decided on a resulting 
trust theory), Justice Ailshie's dissenting opinion for rehearing and modification makes a 
compelling argument that the "agreement" contemplated by Idaho Code Section 45-804 must be 
a valid, enforceable agreement. 
As I read and understand this statute, it is intended to apply to 
cases of contract for the purchase of real property and is meant to 
protect the vendee, where he makes a payment on an agreed 
purchase price; and for some reason or other the vendor either is 
unable to give a title or refuses to comply with his agreement to do 
so, and the consideration for the contract fails. 
58 Idaho 543, 564, 76 P.2d 442, 450 (1937). 
A contract for sale or a deed, which are absolutely void from the 
beginning because of the fact that the vendor is entirely lacking in 
power and authority to transfer the premises, cannot be the 
foundation for a vendee's lien any more than they could be the 
foundation for any other legal or equitable interest in the premises. 
Id. at 567, 76 P.2d at 452 (quoting O'Neill v. Bennett, 49 S.D. 524, 207 N.W. 453) (italics 
omitted). The principles espoused by Justice Ailshie should be adopted by this Court: a void, 
invalid, and unenforceable contract is not the type of "agreemenf' contemplated by Idaho Code 
Section 45-508 and cannot, therefore, serve the basis of a vendee's lien. 
In this matter, it has been established that Barraza did not have a valid and enforceable 
contract for the purchase of the property that would satisfy the second requirement of Idaho 
Code Section 45-508. This Court previously held that the alleged contract by and between 
Barraza and Juan Cuevas was void and unenforceable because it did not comply with the statute 
of frauds. Tr. Vol. I, p. 96, L. 22 - p. 97, L. 10. (attached. hereto as Appendix A for the Court's 
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convenience). The Idaho Supreme Court strongly indicate<l that it agreed with this Court's prior 
conclusion in that regard: 
[I]t is not readily apparent that the contract between the parties 
complies \\lith the statute of frauds, particularly the requirement 
that the contract must 'either contain a sufficient description of the 
real property or refer to an external record containing a sufficient 
property description.' Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 
P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009). Neither the Spanish Document nor the 
English Document contains a legal description of the property. The 
Spanish Document ends 'A'i.th words translate<l as, 'We need the 
Ranch's address.' The English Document merely describes the 
ranch as "29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, ID 83660.' There are a number 
of other potential infirmities, such as the lack of Baez' signature on 
either version of the contract, unclear payment terms, potential 
application of laches, and no showing that Barraza made a tender 
of the balance of the purchase price, among other things. 
Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 7, n. 4 (Idaho March 22, 2012). Indeed, all of 
Barraza' s references to the Supreme Court's opinion for the proposition that an 
"agreement" or "contract" existed overstate the Supreme Court's position, as those 
references more accurately referred to an "alleged agreement" or "alleged contract." 
Because Barraza cannot establish that he had a valid and enforceable agreement for the 
sale of the property, he cannot satisfy the statutory requirements of a vendee's lien. 
B. Statute of Limitations Bars anv Vendee's Lien Theorv 
Barraza's attempts to save the vendee's lien theory from being barred by a limitations 
period highlight the fundamental errors with his argument that an invalid, unenforceable contract 
can give rise to a vendee's lien: namely, if his theory were adopted, a vendee's lien would 
effectively circumvent the statute of frauds. 
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In this matter, Barraza argues that there are two possible "agreements" that give rise to 
his vendee's lien. First, the invalid and unenforceable written agreement for the purchase and 
sale of the property (five year limitations period), and second, the oral modification of that 
written agreement, which provided for a refund of the money paid, if and when Juan Cuevas sold 
the property to a third party (four year limitations period). He then argues that his cause of 
action for the vendee' s lien does not accrue until his cause of action for breach of either of these 
contracts accrued. For the reasons that follow, Barraza's attempts to borrow the accrual dates 
from the causes of action for breach of either of these alleged agreements is misplaced and does 
not provide an accrual date on his vendee's lien. 
Barraza cannot borrow the accrual date for breach of the alleged written agreement 
because, as discussed at length herein, the alleged v.rritten agreement is void for failure to satisfy 
the statute of frauds. As Barraza correctly notes, a cause of action for breach of contract accrues 
upon default or breach of the contract. However, if the contract is void, then there can never be 
an event of default or breach of that void contract: Barraza cannot "borrow' the date of accrual 
from a cause of action that does not exist; this Court cannot pretend that a breach of a void 
contract could exist in order to create an accrual date for a vendee's lien. Accordingly, the void 
and unenforceable VvTi.tten agreement cannot be the underlying contract by which the limitations 
period on Barraza's alleged vendee's lien claim is measured. 
The second alleged contract, the oral modification to the written agreement, is equally 
problematic. First and foremost, if a written contract is void and unenforceable, an oral 
modification to that void contract is a legal nullity. Alternatively, assuming the alleged oral 
modification could stand alone as an independent contract, it is not the type of contract that gives 
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rise to a vendee's lien. The vendee's lien statute provides that money be paid pursuant to a 
contract for the sale of real property. The alleged oral modification was not a contract for the 
sale of real property; it was an agreement for the payment of $20,000.00 upon the vendor's sale 
of the property to a third party. On its face, this type of agreement does not meet the 
requirements of a vendee's lien. Accordingly, breach of an alleged oral contract that does not 
give rise to a vendee's lien cannot establish the accrual of a cause of action for a vendee's lien. 
In his effort to save the alleged vendee's lien from being time barred, Barraza improperly 
combines contracts and theories. While the limitations period for a vendee's lien runs concurrent 
-with the underlying contract that gives rise to the vendee 's lien, such rule cannot apply when 
there is no underlying contract. Similarly, Barraza canI1ot look to a contract which does not give 
rise to a vendee's lien and borrow the accrual date for breach of that contract to save a vendee's 
lien. Because Barraza cannot point to a valid, enforceable contract that gives rise to his vendee' s 
lien, he cannot borrow the accrual date for breach of any contract to save his claim for a vendee' s 
lien. Accordingly, as set forth in Cuevas's opening brief, even if this Court concludes that 
Barraza can have lien rights in the absence of a valid agreement for the sale of real property, then 
such lien rights arise, and a cause of action accrues, at the time the money was paid. Under the 
undisputed facts of this case, such limitations period ran on January 5, 2005, approximately four 
and a half (4 Y2) years before the present lawsuit was filed. Barraza's vendee's lien, if any, is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
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Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Wilfrido respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 
granting his motion for summary judgment and denying Barraza's motion for summary 
judgment. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 2012. 
RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
72-C 4 ·; < -
Rebecca A. Rainey - of the firmQ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of August 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
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method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
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Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~csimile 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION 






discussions. So that's ob sly gone on. 
2 What it appears in this case is, from 
3 my -- at least from what I've seen at this stage 
4 of the proceeding is that Mr. Juan Cuevas and 
s Yrene Baez had been engaged in negotiate -- in 
6 contractual relations and/or activities with both 
7 of these Individuals on this property. So now 
8 that they're here in conflict, I have to plug in 
9 the rules of law to determine who stands in 
10 priority with this property. And I've indicated 
11 at this stage it's up to Mr. Barraza to overcome 
12 the legal presumption that Wilfrido was the owner 
13 of the property. 
14 By doing so, the first step is 
15 demonstrating a legally recognizable claim to the 
16 property. I believe the standard is by evidence 
17 that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing. 
18 But -- and that's more applicable at trial than in 
19 the present instance, because we're in summary 
20 judgment So there needs to be a genuine issue of 
21 fact in that regard. 
22 All right. There is a number of facts 
23 that were presented in this case on behalf of 
24 Mr. Barraza. It is sufficient to note that 
25 Mr. Barraza contends -- and so I'm looking at 
95 
1 to, at best, a breach of contract, or at least 
2 conversion. Unless a lien is authorized by 
3 statute, consented to by the owner, imposed by a 
4 court, or of the type commonly used in a 
5 commercial transaction, it constitutes a 
6 nonconsensual common law lien, and is invalid and 
7 unenforceable. And this is also pursuant to 
B 45-1702 Idaho Code. I think it's also followed up 
9 by 1703 et sequitur. 
10 The case of Browning -- I'm not sure of 
11 this; I can't read my writing here -- versus, it 
12 starts with a G, the second name, but it's 140 
13 Idaho 598, 599 through 600. It's a court of 
14 appeals decision from 2004. Also holds that. 
15 If a lien is improperty filed as a 
16 mechanics lien and the lien is not one otherwise 
17 recognized by law, then the lien Is a 
18 nonconsensual common law lien and is properly 
19 subject to a court order removing the lien, Idaho 
20 Code 45-1703. And also there's the case of 
94 
1 these fac a light most favorable to hlm --
2 that Juan Manuel Cuevas sold the real property 
3 commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road in Parma, 
4 Idaho, and it was pursuant to a written contract. 
5 Now, the written contract appears to be 
6 in the fonn of the English document, but there's 
7 also three documents that have been presented in 
8 the record. One referred to as an English 
9 document, a Spanish document, and then there's 
10 also a lien. That on May 6th, 2002, Mr. Barraza, 
11 the defendant, recorded a lien with the Canyon 
12 County recorder's office against the real 
13 property. 
14 Now, I'll note. The lien states that 
15 it is for $20,000 reimbursement due Mr. Barraza 
16 from Juan and Yrene. But Mr. Barraza has 
17 testified that the lien was filed because 
18 Juan Manuel Cuevas failed to transfer title on the 
19 property to him. So there's an acknowledgement 
20 there that Juan never conveyed title of the 
21 property, or Juan and Yrene never conveyed title 
22 of the property to Mr. Barraza. 
23 I want to talk first about the lien. 
24 45-501 et sequitur of Idaho Code are not 
25 applicable to establish a llen for what amounts 
96 
1 based on what I've got before the court today, 
2 satisfy the statute of frauds. Again, I've cited 
3 9-503 Idaho Code. Holds that no estate or 
4 interest In property can be created, granted, 
5 assigned, et cetera, otherwise done by operation 
6 of law or a conveyance, other than instrument in 
7 writing subscribed by the party creating, 
8 et cetera. 
9 The statute of frauds requires the 
10 writing contain an adequate legal description of 
11 the property. I'm citing callles versus O'Neal, 
12 147 Idaho 841 and other cases, Ray versus Frasun; 
13 for example. And it's -- requires that the 
14 description adequately describe the property so 
15 that it is possible for someone to identify 
16 exactly what property the seller is conveying to 
17 the buyer. A description is adequate if the 
18 quantity, identity, or boundaries of the property 
19 can be determined from the face of the instrument, 
20 or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it 
21 Maxwell versus Twin Falls canal Company, 49 Idaho 21 refers. 
22 806. 22 
23 But I want to talk about the Spanish 23 
24 document. Now, that's in the record. But neither 24 
25 the Spanish document or the English document, 25 
Page 93 to 96 of 154 
Now, the Spanish document does not 
satisfy the statute of frauds, because it is not 
subscribed by the party allegedly conveying the 
property, nor does it contain an adequate legal 




' 1 description of the property. '1 
97 
nglish document 
2 does not have the signature of Yrene Baez, and the 
3 only reference to Yrene is that -- her name on the 
4 document. It's spelled with an I, as opposed to a 
5 Y for Yrene. I'm not sure that's significant, but 
6 there's no signature by her. The English document 
7 contains the street address of the property, but 
8 under that Callies versus O'Neal case, 147 Idaho 
9 841at848, the street address is insufficient and 
10 does not satisfy the statute of frauds. 
11 So here's where it -- this Is my 
12 tentative ruling, but I'll indicate how I'll 
13 proceed when we're done. It does not appear that 
14 having first of all established this first part 
1 s dealing with the quitclaim deed, what it conveys 
16 and where it places Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas, the 
17 record is no -- there's insufficient record before 
18 this court to show that there's any legally 
19 recognizable claim to the property. 
20 Certainly Mr. Barraza has a claim 
21 against Wilfrido and Yrene -- I mean against Juan 
22 and Yrene. That there's no legally recognizable 
23 claim that Mr. Barraza has to the property that 
24 can overcome this presumption, and Wilfrido is the 
25 holder of the record title. So it would appear 
99 
1 to require for an unjust enrichment recovery that 
2 the plaintiff confers some benefit on the 
3 defendant which would be unjust for the defendant 
4 to retain. 
s Okay. The Issues and the arguments 
6 here about the money that Mr. Barraza may have 
7 paid to Mr. Juan Cuevas and Yrene, there's no 
s indication that any of that benefitted 
9 Wilfrido Cuevas. On the issue of improvements to 
10 the real property, there's no evidence before the 
11 court to indicate that there -- that that has 
12 occurred or that that has benefitted 
13 Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas. That may be an area that --
14 oh, I'll get back to this in a moment. 
15 All right. So the -- here's my 
16 tentative ruling, then. And I use that term --
17 I've listened to your argumentsj rve done 
18 preparation of it; I looked at what I saw to be 
19 the issuesi I've made inquiries about what I saw 
20 to be questions I had. They've been answered by 
21 both sides. And I believe as I sit here that the 
22 plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on both 
23 the quiet title .and unjust enrichment claim. 
24 Now, It is not lost on me that this 
25 case is of significant issue and value to 
3ge 97 to 100 of 154 
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1 then that sum judgment should be granted on 
2 the motion quieting title in the property to 
3 Wilfrido Cuevas, 
4 Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, 
5 the elements that Mr. Barraza conferred a benefit 
6 to Wilfrido Cuevas, that Wilfrido appreciated the 
7 benefit, that it would be inequitable for Wilfrido 
8 to accept the benefit without payment of the value 
9 of such benefit. The measure of damages of unjust 
10 enrichr;nent is.the value of the benefit bestowed 
11 upon the defendant, which inequity would be unjust 
12 to retain without recompense to the plaintiff. 
13 Or, in this case, to Mr. Barraza. 
14 I discussed earlier during arguments, 
15 but in the case of Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
16 District versus Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388 at 406, they 
17 cite and review the Beco Construction case. And 
18 they note: The court discussed a number of other 
19 !'ciat;io cases involving unjust enrichment claims, 
20 and noted that in each of these cases, the 
21 pl~intiff and defendant had a contractual 
22 refa~ionship or a claim to real property which 
23 were the underlying reasons for the unjust 
24 enrichment or quasi-contract claims between the 
25 parties. The court recognized that it continues 
100 
1 Mr. Barraza and Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas. That this is 
2 probably their biggest asset that they would have, 
3 this piece of property, and that they're not in 
4 here because they think they're not entitled to 
5 recovery. I think both sides are very sincere, 
6 they believe they are right, and -- in this case. 
7 And that they've already spent a lot of money and 
8 their time and effort, as well as their expenses 
9 to get this litigated. 
10 So that's my tentative ruling. I'm 
11 going to vacate the trial date. Now, if I have 
12 misapplied the law to this or been unfair, in 
13 terms of what you perceive the plaintiff's 
14 argument to be, Mr. Ward, I will wait 30 days 
15 before I issue -- I'm going to direct that Ms. --
16 well, let me pursue it this way. You always have 
17 the right to file a motion to reconsider. But 
18 I've looked at the arguments of the plaintiff, and 
19 I think that they raise those Issues in their 
20 argument: The issue of the claims that could 
21 exist against the property, the deeds -- or the 
22 two written statements or agreements, and the 
23 lien. 
24 So I think that that's been addressed 
25 in there. But I think if that has been 
25 of 59 sheets 
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CANYON COUNTYCL~R~< 
~CRAWFORO,DE?UtY 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR1CT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et 
al. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 09-8175 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT and DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER, having come before the Court on July 20, 2012, pursuant to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas ("Cuevas") and a cross-motion for 
summary judgment filed by Defendant Bernardino Barraza ("Barraza"), both motions having 
been fully brief by the parties, oral argument on the motions was held on October 3, 2012 with 
Rebecca A Rainey appearing on behalf of Plaintiff and Robert Ward appearing on behalf of 
Barraza. Based upon the argument of the parties and the pleadings on file with the Court, the 
finding and conclusions rendered by the Court at such hearing, and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
000046 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, and this does order, that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED this \~ay of October, 2012. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000047 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this j__2_ day of October 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT and DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward {)u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD ( ) Hand Delivered 
340 E. 2nd North Street ( ) Overnight Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Rainey Law Office 
910 W. Main Street, Ste. 258 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Facsimile: (208) 473-2952 
Ou.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
000048 
ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys/or Appellant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Email: Robert@hfwlaw.com 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
~F.._.f A.k }~rD 9.M. 
NOV 2 6 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
51) DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
VS. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants/ Appellant. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, Wilfrido Cuevas, AND THE RESPONDENT'S 
ATTORNEY, Rebecca A Rainey, Rainey Law Office, 910 W. Main Street, Suite 258, Boise, 
Idaho, 83702, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Bernardino Barraza, appeals against the above-
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 15th day of October, 2012, Honorable Molly J. Husky presiding. 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l) 
I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
000049 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends 
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal. 
a. The district court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denying Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. No transcript is necessary since this case was decided in its entirety on summary 
judgment. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 20, 2012 
b. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on July 20, 2012 
c. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 9, 2012 
d. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 
August 9, 2012 
e. Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Opposition to Barraza's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 
17,2012 
7. Civil cases only. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or 
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme 
Court: None. 
8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below: None. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has not been paid an estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript since no transcript is requested. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That all appellate filing fees have been paid. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
000050 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED THIS ~. \ day of November, 2012. 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the c2i day of November, 2012, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of Notice of Appeal by the method indicated below, addressed to the following: 
/~ 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
910 W. MAIN STREET, SUITE 258 
BOISE, ID 83702 
FAX: (208) 473-2952 
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T RANDALL, DEPUTY Ill 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 1!1 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual and 
spouse (if any), DOES I through X, unknown 
claimants to the real property described in 
exhibit "A", commonly known as 29452 Pearl 
Road, Parma, Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40516-2012 
Canyon County Docket No. 2009-817 5 
A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed May 3, 2011, in appeal No. 
38493, Cuevas v. Barraza; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be 
AUGMENTED to include the Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior 
appeal No. 38493. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the 
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included 
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 38493. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD shall be 
filed with this Court after settlement. 


























































DATED this £qtA day of November, 2012. 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 




In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
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BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual ) 






LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual and ) 
spouse (if any), DOES I through X, unknown ) 
claimants to the real property described in ) 
exhibit "A", conunonly known as 29452 Pearl ) 
Road, Parma, Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
DEC 0 7 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T RANDALL, DEPUTY 
ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT 
COURT 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40516-2012 
Canyon County Docket No. 2009-8175 
This appeal is from the District Court's ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed October 15, 2012. It appears that a final judgment set forth on a 
separate document, as required by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(a) and 58(a), has yet to be 
entered. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 l(a), 13.3, and 
l 7(e)(2), the above-entitled matter be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the District Court and 
proceedings in this appeal shall be SUSPENDED to allow for the entry of a final judgment, without 
analysis or a record of prior proceedings. Upon entry of the final judgment by the District Court, 
the District Court Clerk is directed to transmit a certified copy of the judgment to this Court at 
which time this appeal shall proceed. 
ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT COURT- Docket No. 40516-2012 
000054 
DATED this ~ft day of December, 2012. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Judge 
For the Supreme Court 
000055 
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DEC 1 2 2012 
COUNTY 
\{_)..~DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILBRIDIO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, 
et al, 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV09-8175 
JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on j 2 day of December, 2012, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the 
manner described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff: 
Rebecca Ann Rainey 
RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
910 W Main St, Ste 258 
Boise, ID 83702-5750 
• upon counsel for defendant: 
Robert Ward 
HALL FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 E. 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with 
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
JUDGMENT PAGE-2 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
By:_k1----'-Vi)_'J1t_,'--
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
And spouse (if any), 
Defendant-Appellant, 
And 

















Case No. CV-09-08175*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
is being sent as an exhibit: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ----'-"""......___ day of February, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), 
Defendant-Appellant, 
And 

















Case No. CV-09-08175*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Limited Record of the pleadings and documents 
requested. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this__;__;_ day of February, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRISY AMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
~~~~,4'~~ the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 

















BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
And spouse (if any), 
Defendant-Appellant, 
And 
LI OBALDO GARZA, etal., 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court No. 40516-2012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Limited Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows: 
Robert Ward, HALL, FRIEDLY &WARD 
Rebecca A. Rainey, RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this-~- day of February, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
U.H"''""'-'-'" the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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